聯合招聘考試

JOINT RECRUITMENT EXAMINATION

模擬試卷

試題卷（附答案）

本模擬試卷由 10分鐘JRE 生成，供練習用途。

2 題　3 小時

考生須知

(一)　本模擬卷共 2 題，全部試題均須作答。

(二)　請按題目要求界定核心問題，運用資料建立因果分析，並提出具執行機制及政策取捨的建議。

(三)　如輸出 PDF 附有答案，請於完成練習後才查看。

練習完成前
請勿查看答案

試題 (3 小時)

本試卷共 2 題，全部試題均須作答。請按題目要求撰寫完整、具結構的政策論文。

參考資料

【資料時點：2026年8月29日】政府由2024/25學年起把公帑資助院校自資非本地修課課程學生上限，由相當於本地學額的20%提高至40%，並由2026/27學年起再提高至50%。院校可按各自情況逐步增收。非本地生須以自資方式修讀，學費至少足以收回額外直接成本；增加非本地生上限不會減少本地資助學額。

教資會資助課程的非本地學生人數由2024/25學年的26,600人，增至2025/26學年約30,400人（臨時數字），升幅約14%。題述建議「教資會資助大學每年增加自資非本地本科生比例前，須先取得大學教育資助委員會批准」尚未落實。官方資料只界定現行範圍，不能直接證明建議成效。

項目	數字	時點
教資會資助課程的非本地學生人數	2024/25學年26,600人；2025/26學年約30,400人（臨時數字），升幅約14%	2025/26學年
其中修讀本科課程的非本地學生	約20,100人，相當於本地學額約27.1%（全體數字，未按院校分列）	2025/26學年
八所教資會資助大學分配給非本地生的宿位	2023/24學年18,308個；2024/25學年21,168個；2025/26學年23,944個	2023/24至2025/26學年
宿位預計供應	宿舍發展基金下已完成8個項目，約7,800個宿位；餘下7個項目預計陸續完成，涉及逾6,500個宿位；連同私人資助及臨時宿位，全體學生宿位供應預計未來數年增至約50,000個；這包括本地及非本地學生，並非非本地學生未來獲編配的宿位數	2026年
城中學舍計劃	2025年7月開始接受申請：便利改裝商廈等建築物為宿舍，並預留新商業地興建宿舍，以增加宿位供應	2025年7月

本題所引官方資料未列各院校個別比例、上限使用率或宿位短缺數字；也未列未來約50,000個宿位中本地／非本地學生的分配。不能據此推論這些資料從未公布。

資料來源：教育局〈施政報告2025：教育事務委員會討論文件〉；教育局〈2026-27年度開支預算審核：財務委員會問題答覆〉（宿舍及非本地學生數字，2026年）；《2025年施政報告》（城中學舍計劃）。

以下數據為虛構，只供題目練習用途，並非官方統計。院校以甲至辛代稱，各院校的分項只屬假設，合計則與上文官方全體數字一致。

表一：八所假設教資會資助大學2025/26學年的非本地本科生比例及宿位覆蓋（虛構數據，只供練習）

院校	本地資助本科學額	非本地本科生	佔本地學額	獲分配宿位的非本地本科生比例
甲	12,000	3,960	33.0%	68%
乙	10,000	2,800	28.0%	85%
丙	9,500	2,660	28.0%	90%
丁	9,500	2,375	25.0%	95%
戊	9,000	2,340	26.0%	92%
己	8,000	2,000	25.0%	100%
庚	8,000	2,000	25.0%	88%
辛	8,100	1,965	24.3%	100%
合計	74,100	20,100	27.1%	

口徑提示：約50,000個是未來全體學生宿位供應，23,944個是2025/26已編配非本地生的宿位，兩者範圍和時點不同。表一的宿位配置比例只是虛構風險訊號，沒有提供各校住宿需求或輪候，不能直接當作短缺率。官方全文：https://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/tc/about-edb/press/legco/replies-to-fc/edb-c-2627.pdf

1. 你是教育局負責高等教育的政策主任。有意見建議，教資會資助大學每年增加自資非本地本科生比例前，須先取得大學教育資助委員會批准。

(a) 分析該建議的利弊。

(b) 表明你支持抑或反對該建議，並提出理據。

(c)

如支持，提出落實方案；如反對，提出最少兩項同樣能在不扣減本地資助學額下管理非本地本科生增長的其他措施。

作答：

參考資料

Information date: 17 October 2026.

File A: Existing funding context

CSTB's current Mega Arts and Cultural Events Fund page invites applications under its new mechanism. The September 2026 Guide applies to applications submitted on or after 1 September 2026. It provides Direct Grant and Matching Grant routes with eligibility, assessment and funding agreements; it does not promise every arts event support. Grants are paid by milestones. The first instalment is normally at most 50%; final and any interim payments depend on the applicable conditions. Grantees bear deficits, and unspent grant and operating surplus in respect of approved budget items must be returned up to the grant amount. Double subsidy is prohibited.

The ticket guarantee below is a new policy option requiring separate legal, financial and budget consideration. It is not described as an entitlement under that Guide. LegCo's Mode of organizing mega-sports events as well as the roles of governments in selected places (RT02/2023) provides historical research on public roles, additionality and accountability. This is an arts case; old sports-funding ceilings and foreign arrangements are not its funding terms.

File B: Event budget and funding approaches — fictional

The event's common cost estimate is HK$16 million, including HK$4 million for overseas performer and production rights. It excludes any additional borrowing cost and the Government's assessment, monitoring or guarantee-administration cost. Cash sponsors have committed HK$6 million, of which HK$2 million would arrive before ticket sales open and HK$4 million later. The organiser commits up to HK$4 million of its own equity capital at risk. Before ticket sales open, HK$8 million of deposits and preparation payments would fall due. No bridging loan or accelerated sponsor payment is signed.

- Grant approach: an approved ceiling of HK$3 million, with up to HK$1.5 million as the first instalment once conditions are met. For comparison, assume the common HK$16 million costs are verified eligible expenditure. Any unspent grant and operating surplus would be returned up to the amount of grant received. The organiser remains responsible for the remaining deficit. Eligibility, approved scope and a full funding agreement would still be required.
- Proposed guarantee: after audited ticket settlement, the Government would top up net ticket receipts towards HK$8 million, paying no more than HK$4 million. The organiser keeps receipts above the target and bears losses outside this formula. Net ticket receipts exclude refunds. There is no upfront payment under this proposal, no guarantee of the organiser's debts and no promise to fund cost overruns. Detailed claims, cancelled-event and recovery terms have not been agreed.

The two approaches would be alternatives, not cumulative support for the same event costs. An organiser may seek other finance, subject to disclosure and the relevant rules.

File C: Demand file — fictional

At an average net ticket price of HK$400, the promoter presents three sales scenarios: 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 tickets. No probabilities are assigned. The common cost and cash sponsorship are unchanged in these comparisons. They are not independent forecasts or advance sales.

An online interest register contains 600 respondents: 450 describe themselves as local and 150 as non-local. Of the latter, sixty already planned a Hong Kong trip and ninety say the event would be their main reason for travelling. No tickets or travel bookings have been checked. The venue capacity counts admissions across six performances, not unique visitors or tourists.

Local arts groups value opportunities for local performers and technical crews but ask how they would actually participate. Nearby businesses anticipate trade, while community representatives raise late-night transport, noise and the opportunity cost of public support. The draft programme does not yet specify the local development work or how it would be evaluated.

File D: Readiness and protection — fictional

The organiser says it cannot make the full commitment without public support, but has supplied no verified comparison with a smaller event or private financing. Its insurance quotation covers specified cancellation causes; weak ticket sales are excluded. The venue hold and major supplier contracts have different confirmation and cancellation dates. Refund arrangements, treatment of sponsor money after cancellation and priority between creditors have not been agreed with all parties. The committee wants credible evidence before accepting an irreversible commitment.

2. Scenario

You are a Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau officer assessing public support for a fictional international arts event proposed for September 2027. The organiser has delivered comparable events elsewhere but this would be its first Hong Kong edition. A suitable venue has been provisionally held for six performances, with total ticket capacity of 30,000.

The finance team asks whether to negotiate a grant of up to HK$3 million under applicable funding arrangements, explore a new capped ticket-revenue guarantee, or provide neither. An indicative HK$4 million maximum event-support exposure is available for consideration, not an approval to issue a guarantee or spend money.

Task

Write a funding recommendation comparing the proposed structures and the option of declining support. Explain who bears demand and delivery risk, whether the event's public value justifies intervention, and what must be settled before any commitment. Address cash flow, verification, cancellation, full public and private costs and evaluation. The event, offers, costs, demand and funding envelope are fictional; existing fund rules are separately described below. Do not assume that a guarantee is already an available fund product.

作答：

答案及解析

以下答案及解析由 app 題庫生成，供完成練習後對答案用途。

第 1 題

中文題 > 教育 > 高等教育 | essay | Q4OPAZMAXFS

建議答案

參考答案：我反對要求教資會資助大學每年增加自資非本地本科生比例前，一律先取得教資會批准。我支持對容量及本地學生利益建立有約束力的監察，也接受高風險增收須受限制；但較願把新增監管集中在具體容量風險，另實際補足資源，而不把每次比例上升均改成事前許可。

原案最有力的好處，是在大學發出錄取及資源壓力形成前先把關。增加非本地生可能帶來學術交流、人才及自資收入，也會使用住宿、教學及輔導。若每年先核容量，政府較能統籌院校增長，也讓本地學生知道新增收生並非任由市場推動。原案可設清楚準則和提早申請，未必一定延誤。我不會因沒有現成評估表便否定它，更不會以自主為由拒絕問責。

我的取捨是，年度比例本身不是資源風險的完整指標。同樣的增加，對已有教師及床位的院校與尚欠容量者，影響不同；每次均待外部批准，仍會把低風險的收生調整納入審理，增加院校和教資會持續工作，也減少大學在既定上限內回應學術需要的空間。清楚及快速程序可減輕這些代價，卻不能完全消除決策權的轉移。我較重視讓院校承擔有證據的容量責任，接受這未能像全面事前批准般逐次審視所有增加。

題內數字既不證明全面審批必要，也不證明可以放任。2025/26非本地本科生約20,100人，相對74,100個本地學額約27.1%；這不是非本地生佔全體學生的比例。虛構甲校33%，低於當年40%上限，但宿位配置68%，值得核查住宿需求和教學容量。68%不是短缺率，其他學生可能不申請宿舍；同樣，全體27.1%較低也不能證明甲校沒有壓力。下一學年上限增至50%，不能把甲當年的33%說成已用了新上限82.5%。

宿舍數字亦須分清。23,944個是2025/26分配給各層次非本地生的宿位，未來約50,000個則包括本地及非本地學生，不能相減成非本地短缺。政府已推宿舍發展基金和城中學舍，院校也已有規劃及問責安排，不能說完全無人管理。非本地生自資學費至少收回額外直接成本、不減本地資助學額，是擴展的重要保障，但共用課程、設施及輔導仍須有實際供應，不能只靠學費原則證明一切充足。

第一項其他措施是訂立新的容量預警及有針對性的補救責任。教育局應與教資會及院校建立共同口徑，要求在發出新增收生承諾前，按下一學年的預期人數核對已落實宿位、核心課程名額、教師和輔導工時，同時列明本地學生的學額及服務保障。這些資料可銜接現有三年規劃及大學問責協議，但新增的是須及時處理具體容量風險的責任，並非首次交計劃或公布統計。

對有可信證據顯示增收將造成嚴重未補足需要的院校，主管方面須及早核證，要求具期限及實際資源的補救，必要時依法限制尚未作承諾的增收，直到容量到位；其餘院校在上限及既定責任內決定收生，不用每次比例增加都先取許可。這種規管仍會約束部分大學，可能誤判或漏報，須有公開準則、提出解釋及覆核的程序，也不能拖到學生長期受損才介入。教資會本身沒有法定或行政執行權，教育局必須先核清可依法成立的資助、問責或其他法律安排，必要時修訂法例，不能假定委員會已可自行罰款或撤銷錄取。

第二項措施是由院校提前購買實際增容所需的住宿與教學支援。院校須先列出宿舍基金、私人資助、城中學舍及既定增聘已能提供甚麼，只為尚未覆蓋而經核實的需要，預租合規床位及安排額外核心課程、學習輔導和學生支援工時。這不只是要求另一份報表，而是簽訂租約、聘請合資格人員並交付學生可使用的床位與服務；即使沒有觸發監管限制，也可按確定需求獨立進行。

增容應在招收新一批學生前完成可行安排，租約要核安全、交通、價格及履約，聘人要有課程時間及督導，不能把尚在申請的項目當可用容量。成本應由相應自資收入及院校合法財務安排承擔；如需公共撥款，先取得批准，不扣減本地資助學額，亦不把本地生既有床位或服務改名撥走。預租可能因收生不足而空置，招聘亦有時間和經常成本，院校須承擔及披露這些風險，而不是假定額外學費必然足夠。

兩項措施分別增加針對容量風險的責任與實際服務供應，並非把規劃、儀表板和補交計劃算成三項。我接受它們不能保證所有壓力被預測，也可能較全面審批少一道逐次審查；我仍選擇在不減本地資助學額下，以可執行的容量底線及真正增容管理增長。檢討應看未滿足住宿需求、核心課程及輔導可用程度、本地學生服務和各校財務，不只以非本地生比例升跌評價成敗。

解析

【決定的是逐年事前批准】

原案要求教資會資助大學每年提高自資非本地本科生比例前先獲批准。不能只討論50%上限好壞，亦不能把現行上限、三年規劃或問責協議當成這項年度逐次批准已存在。事前批准可在承諾收生前統籌宿位、教學及公共資源，給本地學生較清楚的保障；合理設計亦可提早申請、公布準則，不能因題目未寫這些細節便說必拖延。

反對的可辯護取捨是：凡增加均經事前許可，會把原由大學在上限內承擔的部分收生決策移至外部；即使程序清楚，仍要審理低風險增幅。可選針對有證據容量風險的新責任及實際增容，接受它較難完全阻止預測失準的代價。不能只說「大學自主」便免除資助及學生利益的問責。

【數字不可混口徑】

2024/25起40%，2026/27起50%，分母均是本地學額，非全體學生。2025/26非本地學生約30,400包含不同修課層次，本科約20,100；不得用兩者互換。虛構表20,100／74,100約27.1%，低於上限不證每校或每項資源均足夠。甲3,960／12,000＝33%，是當年40%上限的82.5%，不是2026/27的50%使用率；全體平均也不能抹平甲與其他院校的差異。

甲宿位配置68%不等32%需要宿舍而無位，因住宿需求及自選租住未列。23,944是2025/26已編配所有非本地生的宿位，未來約50,000是全體學生供應，時點和母群不同，不能相減得非本地缺口，也不能用23,944除本科20,100斷無短缺。學費至少收回額外直接成本、不減本地資助學額，是重要基線，卻不自動證明共用教學、住宿或輔導容量不受壓。

【反對後須有兩項不同工作】

第一項可訂新的容量預警及有針對性的介入責任：大學須在收生承諾前以預測需求、落實資源及本地學生服務保障作評估，對具體高風險個案依法要求補救，必要時限制尚未承諾的增收。平常不用每次增加都先取批准，但不能等已發生長期嚴重短缺才處理。規劃、報表及儀表板是同一監管措施的工具，不各算一項。

第二項可由院校實際購買未獲既定計劃覆蓋的額外住宿和核心教學支援容量，在需要出現前完成租約、教師及輔導工時安排。既有宿舍發展基金、城中學舍及院校增聘並非空白；新增部分須具體扣除已承諾資源，不以首次倡議建宿舍作理由。兩項分別改變監管責任與實際服務供給，可獨立執行及核成本；只寫提交計劃、公布數字、未達標再交計劃不足兩項。

【權責與風險】

教資會是諮詢及資助角色，本身沒有法定或行政執行權。新增有約束力的限制，須由教育局連同院校核清法例、合法資助或問責安排及必要修訂，不能稱教資會已可隨意罰款、撤回錄取或單方減學額。現有三年規劃及大學問責協議可作銜接，但新的容量義務必須實際成立。

措施要保留本地資助學額，不把其宿位或服務權益拿走充作增容；非本地學費及院校財務須承擔適當新增成本，公共資源需先批准。預警可能漏報、臨時租位可能空置、師資難及時補足，均要交代。支持完整年度事前批准亦可有據成立，應交完整審批、資源及申訴方案。評核不以示範反對立場、任意增幅門檻或某一指標作唯一答案。

第 2 題

建議答案

參考答案：To: Funding Assessment Committee

Subject: Public support for the proposed September 2027 arts event

I recommend pursuing a capped grant of up to HK$3 million, with the applicable recovery and milestone terms, rather than developing a ticket guarantee for this event. No award should be made until public value, funding eligibility, the remaining cash gap and cancellation arrangements are demonstrated. If these cannot be established before the venue commitment, we should decline support or consider a genuinely smaller proposal. The organiser's overseas record is relevant to delivery, but does not prove Hong Kong demand or a need for public underwriting.

The event may bring worthwhile cultural access, collaboration and visitor activity. A grant can support benefits which the promoter cannot fully capture in ticket prices, such as local professional development, if these are made real deliverables. The strongest objection is that taxpayers would support a private event which might proceed anyway, displace other cultural spending or produce limited local benefit. Obtain a credible no-support and smaller-event case, committed private finance and a specific local programme, rather than accepting the claim that the full event needs us. The available interest register cannot settle additionality.

The sales scenarios show different risk allocation. At HK$400, ticket receipts would be HK$4 million, HK$8 million or HK$12 million. Adding HK$6 million sponsorship against HK$16 million costs leaves deficits of HK$6 million and HK$2 million, or a HK$2 million surplus, before public support and excluded costs. These figures describe an event budget, not economic value added to Hong Kong.

Under the grant approach, assuming HK$3 million is disbursed against verified eligible expenditure, the low-sales deficit falls to HK$3 million. In the middle case, the HK$1 million surplus after the grant would be returned, leaving net public support of HK$2 million. In the high case, recovery is limited to the HK$3 million paid, and the organiser retains its underlying HK$2 million surplus. Net public support is therefore HK$3 million, HK$2 million or zero: the recovery terms make the eventual public cost depend on the outcome.

The guarantee would pay HK$4 million, zero or zero, topping up ticket receipts towards HK$8 million subject to a HK$4 million cap. In the low case, ticket receipts and the payment reach HK$8 million, but the event still has a HK$2 million deficit after sponsorship; losses and overruns beyond the guarantee remain with the organiser. The guarantee uses more public money than the grant in the low case and less in the middle case. Choosing between them therefore requires a judgement about risk allocation, with further evidence needed to estimate expected cost because no scenario probabilities are supplied. Sales below the illustrated range and cancellation also require assessment.

A guarantee could encourage the promoter to commit while protecting the public from paying when ordinary demand is sufficient. It may therefore be attractive where a verified event has large external benefits and demand risk is the binding obstacle. However, below the target and while the cap is not binding, additional ticket revenue can replace public payment rather than improve the organiser's position, weakening some marginal sales incentives. That does not prove it will stop marketing: reputation, future events and upside still matter. It creates a need for credible marketing commitments and auditable prices, refunds, related-party sales and settlement. Creating and administering this new obligation for one event also requires authority and expertise not established by the indicative envelope. The existing grant route offers a more developed accountability framework, although it too

needs proper assessment and monitoring.

Cash flow is a separate problem. Before ticket sales, the stated HK$4 million own cash and HK$2 million early sponsorship provide HK$6 million against HK$8 million due. A maximum first grant instalment of HK$1.5 million still leaves at least HK$500,000 to finance. The guarantee pays nothing upfront, leaving HK$2 million. Neither can be advertised as a complete financing solution. Obtain a dated cash-flow plan, binding sponsor and lender commitments or agreed payment changes, and price finance and security. A projected later payment is not cash available today. Do not require the Government to guarantee a bank loan by implication or release grant funds before its conditions merely to rescue a contract the organiser signed early.

The grant agreement should specify supported expenditure, confirmed resources, local cultural and audience deliverables, milestones, reporting and recovery. Assess eligibility under the current Guide and reconcile other public and private support so that each cost is funded only once. The funding authority should reserve the full authorised commitment and provide assessment resources, with legal, procurement and financial approvals settled before an award. The indicative HK$4 million envelope is a planning limit; any guarantee or later deficit support would require its own authority and approval.

Before the venue hold becomes irreversible, reconcile venue, performer, supplier and sponsorship cancellation terms. Specify ticket refunds, insurance coverage and exclusions, what happens to unspent funds, reporting of changes and recovery rights. Weak sales are not covered by the quoted insurance. Government recovery clauses may be worth little if the organiser has no assets, so examine financial capacity and proportionate security without pretending a contractual promise assures collection. Confirm safe event operation and who funds transport, policing, cleanliness or other public services required; these are not all inside the promoter's HK$16 million. Staff and local participants also bear time and opportunity costs, while overseas rights fees and imports affect the local economic account.

For evaluation, distinguish admissions, unique spectators, actual tourists and trips induced by the event. Ninety non-local respondents naming it as their main reason are neither verified incremental visitors nor a proportion to apply automatically to 30,000 admissions. Examine visitor origins and travel decisions with a transparent method, local displacement, local work and learning, cultural quality, full public cost and the organiser's audited accounts. Ticket receipts, hotel spending and suppliers' sales cannot simply be added as Hong Kong value added. Continued support should depend on this public value and the next event's actual financing need, not a guarantee of recurring subsidy. Honour the approved agreement while refusing unapproved exposure.

解析

The task chooses a public funding structure for one arts event, not a venue-booking priority or a general requirement that all events be subsidised. Credit existing Mega ACE grants and use the September 2026 rules, while treating the ticket guarantee as a proposed new instrument requiring its own authority. A grant ceiling or an indicative envelope is not automatic eligibility, a payment approval or power to guarantee debt.

Separate the event's commercial account from public value and cash flow. Ticket receipts are HK$4m, HK$8m and HK$12m; with HK$6m sponsorship and HK$16m common costs, the unsupported balances are minus HK$6m, minus HK$2m and plus HK$2m. A fully disbursed HK$3m grant would produce repayment of zero, HK$1m or HK$3m under the stated surplus rule, leaving net support HK$3m, HK$2m or zero. The guarantee formula pays min(HK$4m, max(HK$8m minus net ticket receipts, zero)): HK$4m, zero or zero. It does not guarantee all costs or the organiser's creditors. These calculations exclude further costs and do not establish expected expenditure without probabilities.

Cash timing can make an apparently affordable option undeliverable. HK$4m own funds and HK$2m early sponsorship fall HK$2m short of HK$8m due before sales. Even the maximum HK$1.5m first grant leaves HK$0.5m. Later reimbursement or a revenue floor is not an advance. Obtain actual finance and cancellation commitments rather than assume a bank will lend or that an insurer covers poor demand. A change in scope or a refusal to proceed can be appropriate; no fixed finance package is compulsory.

Both structures alter incentives. The guarantee avoids public payment when ticket receipts are sufficient, but within part of its range additional receipts can substitute for public payment. Its cap leaves some loss with the organiser. Grant recovery protects against surplus while still supporting a middle-demand deficit. Neither mechanism proves careless behaviour, guaranteed recovery or universal superiority. Compare the organiser's risk capital, deliverables, audit, related-party transactions and realistic enforcement costs.

The online register is a self-selected expression of interest, not verified attendance or a representative survey. Local and non-local respondents, additional trips and admissions are distinct units. Economic value added is not the sum of ticket, hotel and supplier turnover; examine displacement and imported inputs without assuming all ticket income lacks local value. Cultural and industry-development benefits may justify support beyond immediate cash return if actually specified and evaluated.

The model prefers a conditional award through the grant framework; a well-justified guarantee or no-support choice can also perform well. The recommendation must settle actual public benefit, readiness, maximum exposure, cash gaps, cancelled-event treatment, full public and private costs, approvals and credible evaluation. There is no required expected-value calculation, fixed trial or compromise. Do not silently combine the two instruments or assume every unpriced cost fits inside the cap.